Less than 40 countries have so far submitted their revised NDCs. Others are expected to follow.
On 24 September 2025, the UN General Assembly convened a high-level special event on ‘Climate Action’, where leaders renewed calls for accelerated national climate action, stronger financing commitments, and bridging the gap between pledges and delivery ahead of COP30. The UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, in his opening remarks said, “it is still possible to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees by century’s end” and urged countries to submit more ambitious climate plans without delay.
In this context, RR Rashmi, Distinguished Fellow, TERI, writes on COP30 in Belém — a conference that will test whether global ambition can withstand mounting geopolitical tensions, financial constraints, and widening implementation gaps.
COP30 in Belém: Context and Stakes
The next climate conference scheduled in Brazil is getting closer even as the prospects of global cooperation continue to dim further by the day. In this scenario, questions are being asked whether Belém COP will be able to give momentum to global climate efforts. The United States, the biggest economy on earth and the second largest emitter is not engaged in the process; its non-involvement in the past has often acted as dampener. On the other hand, the geopolitical situation remains highly volatile as conflicts on security, trade, and energy-related issues rage in several parts of the world. These show no signs of respite and there is genuine apprehension that the resolve and ability of many countries to meet obligations will be impacted.
This is a worrying situation as COP30 in Belém must deal with three key tasks under the Paris Agreement; these are sequel to the decisions taken at Baku last year. One, it has to ensure that all countries submit their revised NDCs in 2025 as per the mandate of the Paris Agreement. Two, it has to agree on a road map for mobilising USD 1.3 trillion of climate finance by all actors, as agreed at Baku. Three, it has to agree on a set of global indicators for benchmarking the global goal on adaptation; these indicators will provide guidance to national adaptation plans.
Legacy of the Global Stocktake
The NDCs had been originally framed in 2015-16 when the Paris Agreement was yet to be ratified; these were confirmed or updated when the Paris Agreement commenced its operation in 2021. COP decisions oblige each country to revise its NDC every 5 years. The NDCs have to be revised at or before COP30 in the backdrop of a finding by the Global Stocktake (GST) of efforts under the Paris Agreement. The first GST that took place at Dubai in 2023 concluded that the world is not on track to meet the 1.5°C goal of global climate stabilization. The implication is that the efforts being made by international community for emissions reduction as well as contribution to the means of implementation are inadequate.
The GST is not backed by a strong enforcement mechanism; it is at best a facilitative exercise aimed at helping countries identify the gaps and enhance their efforts in the next cycle of NDCs. Further, the stress on global energy supplies following the Ukraine-Russia conflict and wars in the Middle East makes it almost certain that most players will find it difficult to adhere to the plans for accelerated energy transition.
Tracking NDC Progress
The Brazilian Presidency appears to be cognisant of this challenge and is reportedly placing as much emphasis on filling the gaps in implementation of NDCs as on setting ambitious targets in the next round of NDCs. Less than 40 countries have so far submitted their revised NDCs. Others are expected to follow. While countries are required to raise ambition in the forthcoming NDCs because of the ratcheting mechanism of the Paris Agreement and many countries may do it for the sake of record, the implementation gap is serious and may well affect the ambition in the second round of NDCs. The GST had noted that, even by 2030, the maximum impact of the first round of all NDCs on the greenhouse gas (GHG) emission levels will be only 5.3% over 2019 levels. Contrast this with the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) projection for climate stabilization which says that “limiting global warming to 1.5°C with no or limited overshoot requires deep, rapid and sustained reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions–specifically, a 43% reduction by 2030 and a 60% reduction by 2035, relative to the 2019 levels.’’
India’s Position: Progress and Challenges
India has already made substantial progress towards meeting its NDC goals expressed in terms of emissions intensity of GDP and energy transition. By 2020, India has reduced the emissions intensity of output by 32% compared with 2005 levels. This is supported primarily by growing energy efficiency in key sectors of economy and huge growth of renewable energy in the total energy supply. Electricity generation capacity from renewable energy has seen a spectacular jump reaching almost 43% of total capacity. Renewable energy has become cost-competitive with coal even while grid stability is being attempted through additions to other sources of clean energy such as nuclear and hydro power. Emission reduction in hard-to-abate sectors e.g. industries, and transport is dependent on availability of cost-effective carbon-free or low-carbon fuels. Here, the progress is slow, but the momentum is being given through National Green Hydrogen Mission, production linked incentives for manufacture of energy-related equipment including electric mobility, and a push on blending of transport fuels with ethanol and low-carbon sustainable fuels. Other regulatory measures have been taken to create favourable ecosystem for climate actions. These include the launch of an Indian carbon market prescribing emissions intensity targets for eight key industrial sectors, Business Responsibility and Sustainability Reporting (BRSR) guidelines for 1000 top companies by market capitalization listed on the stock exchange, and a tentative climate risk assessment framework developed by the RBI for financial institutions.
Additional finance and private sector participation is critical for enhancing climate ambition in India in the next and subsequent rounds. When submitting its first NDC, India had announced that its NDC implementation is conditional to availability of international financial support. In reality, most of India’s current climate actions is financed by domestic sources. Quite clearly, the government alone will not be able to generate or mobilize adequate additional finance at scale to support future ambitious goals. Certainty in the regulatory environment and policy support is also crucial to attract private sector finance and international investments in the future. The government has done well to come up with a green taxonomy framework to act as guidance for green investments in the field of mitigation and adaptation. The government has also taken the initiative of raising sustainable finance through sovereign green bonds totalling over USD 5.5 billion in the last few years, giving an important signal to the financial markets.
Financing the Transition
From this perspective, the global climate finance scenario does not look very promising. At Baku, the climate conference agreed to a new finance goal for developed countries of USD 300 billion per year and a collective goal of USD 1.3 trillion to be reached by 2035. As expected, the emphasis is on securing additional flows mostly through multilateral development banks and the private sector. There is also an expectation that the recipient countries should create favourable policy environment and offer financial support in the form of guarantees or risk reduction mechanisms to attract such flows. The COP Presidency has recently talked of launching a global forum that could discuss use of carbon market-related measures under Article 6 to help generate additional finance.
While all these overtures may encourage some additional actions, ambition of countries in the next round of NDCs will depend a lot on trust in the fairness of effort-sharing regime under the Paris Agreement. The incentive to raise ambition is weak for those countries which feel that the burden of global efforts is not being shared equitably. As the Paris Agreement has effectively divorced future actions from the responsibility for historical emissions, countries in the Global South are expected to do more merely because they have a higher share in future emissions. For example, in 2022, India was rated by Climate Transparency, a global think-tank as being amongst the top G20 countries that had an effective 2-degree compatible NDC. But India’s rank was lowered the very next year when they drew up a least cost global emissions trajectory compatible with 2-degree goal and used the current share of countries in the global carbon budget as the basis for allocation of target. A global effort-sharing framework for NDCs based on share in total current and past emissions and one that rewards countries for achieving targets faster or higher can help incentivize ambition.
The current scenario at Belém once again points to the importance of equity in collective effort; the pathway to 1.5°C temperature goal will remain unachievable until a framework is established for collective and equitable effort sharing, within which the NDCs are contextualized and prepared.